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Duration of Equity Overvaluation and Managers’ Choice to Use Aggressive
Underlying Earnings Disclosure and Accrual-based earnings Management:
Australian Evidence

Abstract
This paper examines whether equity overvaluation duration influences managers’
choice of different earnings management mechanisms and how corporate governance
and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission’s underlying earnings
disclosure guidelines influence managers’ choices. The study samples Australian
Securities Exchange 200 firms from 2009–2016. Findings show that on average, firms
more likely engage in accrual-based earnings management in the early overvaluation
stage. In later stages, firms more likely disclose underlying earnings aggressively to
sustain overvaluation. Additionally, firms with a high proportion of independent
directors on the board prefer to disclose underlying earnings aggressively to sustain
the equity overvaluation; firms with a low proportion of independent directors prefer
both accrual-based earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings
disclosure to sustain the overvaluation. Moreover, firms that conform to the
Commission’s underlying earnings disclosure guidelines use neither accrual-based
earnings management nor aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain
overvaluation, but non-conforming firms use both mechanisms.

JEL classification: M41
Key words: underlying earnings disclosure, accrual-based earnings management,
equity overvaluation, corporate governance, ASIC underlying earnings guideline
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1. Introduction
Because earnings and their growth are key components determining firm value,
managers are highly motivated to increase earnings and their growth expectations,
ultimately inflating firm value to increase stock prices (Adams et al., 2009;
Badertscher, 2011; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Graham et al., 2005). Evidence shows
that managers’ wealth increases as a firm’s stock price increases, because their
compensation is associated with the stock price via stock performance-based
incentives (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Moreover, managers’ job security in
the executive labour market typically increases with strong performance of the firm’s
stock, with a manager being less likely to lose a job when the stock is performing well
(Jensen, 2005). These motivations typically stimulate managers to strive for higher
stock prices. Studies have found that managers are fully aware of opportunities to
manage earnings, and earnings management is the main approach used by managers
to obtain their desired economic outcomes because investors are unlikely to uncover
earnings management (Badertscher, 2011; Nelson et al., 2002, 2003; Xie, 2001).
However, the aggregate shareholder value destroyed by earnings management far
exceeds that of high-profile fraud cases (Badertscher, 2011; Graham et al., 2005).
Jensen’s (2005) agency theory of overvalued equity suggests that when a firm’s stock
price becomes overvalued, the firm maintains the overvaluation by participating in a
variety of earnings management choices. Previous research has provided empirical
evidence consistent with Jensen’s (2005) conjecture. For instance, Efendi et al. (2007)
demonstrated that firms exhibiting signs of overvaluation in the years prior to
engaging in non-statutory earnings management increase managers’ stock
compensation incentives to sustain the overvalued stock prices. Badertscher (2011)
indicated that overvaluation is an important determinant of earnings management
decisions. This author found that managers participate in accrual-based earnings
management in the early stage of overvaluation, then move to real activities earnings
management to sustain the overvaluation of the equity; in the later stages, managers
tend to engage in non-generally accepted accounting principle (non-GAAP) earnings
management. Although several studies have investigated the correlation between
overvaluation of equity and earnings management, there remains limited empirical
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evidence for the correlation between the duration of overvaluation and management’s
choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms (Badertscher, 2011).
This paper initially examines whether the duration of overvaluation affects managers’
decisions to use different earnings management mechanisms. It investigates whether
the duration of equity overvaluation affects managers’ choice to use accrual-based
earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosure. The results
demonstrate that, on average, in the early stage of overvaluation, managers are more
likely to use accrual-based earnings management. In the later stage, they run out of
accrual-based earnings management choices and resort to aggressive underlying
earnings disclosure to maintain overvaluation. Second, this paper investigates whether
corporate governance influences managers’ choice of different earnings management
mechanisms. The results show that firms with a high proportion of independent
directors on the board do not choose accrual-based earnings management to sustain
overvaluation but instead prefer to disclose underlying earnings aggressively in the
later stage of overvaluation. Firms with a low proportion of independent directors are
more likely to use both earnings management mechanisms to sustain overvaluation.
Finally, this paper examines the effects of the Australian Securities and Investment
Commission (ASIC) underlying earnings disclosure guidelines on management’s
choice of earnings management mechanisms. Because the ASIC guidelines are
voluntary, we examine the influence of overvaluation on the choice of earnings
management mechanisms by firms that conform to the guidelines and by those that do
not. We find that firms that conform to the ASIC underlying earnings disclosure
guidelines do not use either accrual-based earnings management or aggressive
underlying earnings disclosure to sustain overvaluation. However, firms that do not
conform to the ASIC underlying earnings disclosure guidelines are more likely to use
both accrual-based earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings
disclosure to sustain overvaluation.
The additional test investigates whether the constraints of using accrual-based
earnings management encourage managers to engage in aggressive underlying
earnings disclosure. This study finds that equity-overvalued firms with a high level of
accrual-based earnings management constraints only engage in aggressive underlying
earnings disclosure to maintain overvaluation.
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This paper contributes to the literature on equity overvaluation and earnings
management by examining whether managers alternate between accrual-based
earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain
overvaluation. Three previous studies have examined the association between
aggressive non-statutory earnings reporting (pro forma earnings) with within-statutory
earnings management techniques (accrual-based earnings management and/or real
activities earnings management) (Black et al., 2014; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al.,
2010). All three studies found that managers alternate between accrual-based earnings
management and aggressive non-GAAP earnings reporting. However, they did not
examine whether the duration of equity overvaluation incentives affects managers’
choice to use accrual-based earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings
disclosure. Second, although previous studies have examined the relationship between
non-GAAP earnings and accrual-based earnings management using the absolute value
of accrual-based earnings management, this paper examines whether managers use
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure and income-increasing accrual-based
earnings management alternatively or simultaneously. Third, this paper empirically
tests Jensen’s (2005) agency theory of overvalued equity. Badertscher (2011)
examined overvaluation and managers’ choice of non-statutory earnings management,
and found that overvalued firms are more likely to engage in non-GAAP earnings
management than are firms that are not overvalued. However, Badertscher (2011)
defined non-GAAP earnings management as firms that identified restatement
announcements that raised questions about the quality of financial reporting. It is
unclear whether managers use aggressive non-GAAP earnings reporting as an
earnings management tool to substitute for other earnings management tools to
sustain overvalued equity. This paper extends Badertscher (2011) by investigating
how the duration of overvalued firms affects managers’ use of accrual-based earnings
management and aggressive underlying earnings (similar to non-GAAP earnings in
the US) disclosure. Finally, this paper is the first to examine whether corporate
governance and ASIC’s underlying earnings disclosure guidelines influence
managers’ decision-making on using different earnings management techniques to
sustain overvaluation. We extend the results of Baderscher (2011) because we find
not only that on average, managers use earnings management mechanisms
alternatively to sustain the equity overvaluation but also that if firms have a lower
proportion of independent directors or do not conform to the ASIC underlying
5

earnings guidelines, then managers prefer to use earnings management mechanisms
simultaneously to sustain the equity overvaluation.
We have organised the paper as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review.
Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design of this
study. Section 5 presents the descriptive statistics, Pearson and Spearman correlations,
and regressions results. Section 6 provides the additional test, and Section 7
concludes.
2. Literature review
2.1. Underlying earnings
Underlying earnings are calculated based on the judgements of the preparer and
reflect the core/recurring business activities of reporting firms. They are voluntarily
reported earnings on a basis other than the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS), or consistent with IFRS and then adjusted by firm managers
(Australian Institute of Company Directors [AICD] and Financial Services Institute of
Australasia [FINSIA], 2009). Firms use various labels to describe underlying
earnings, including pro forma earnings; normalised earnings; underlying earnings
before interest and taxes (EBIT); underlying earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA); earnings before exceptional items; results
excluding exceptional items; results before non-recurring items; results before
significant items; results before special items; results before specific items; adjusted
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation; or adjusted operating
earnings (AICD and FINSIA, 2009; Ernst and Young, 2007). The underlying earnings
used in this paper represent all such terms because they provide an alternative to
statutory earnings. Although there is no general agreement on computing underlying
earnings, significant non-recurring items and IFRS-driven unrealised gains and losses
are generally often excluded (AICD and FINSIA, 2009).
The adoption of underlying earnings is a common phenomenon in Australian firms.
For example, Woodside Petroleum Limited’s 2012 annual report documented that
‘underlying net profit after tax was $2,061 million, which was a 25% increase on the
2011 figure’ (Woodside Petroleum, 2012, p. 4). Boral Limited documented a net
statutory loss of $91 million, whereas underlying profits after tax was a positive $132
6

million in its 2010 annual report (Boral, 2010, p. 23). A study conducted by KPMG in
2009 found that 84% of firms on the ASX 100 Index presented underlying earnings as
a response to growing dissatisfaction with statutory earnings as representative of
firms’ actual economic performance (KPMG, 2009). In 2012, 32 of 50 ASX Index
firms chose to report financial results using underlying earnings of economic
performance in addition to statutory earnings (KPMG, 2013). Recently, investors
have focussed more on underlying earnings than on conventional statutory earnings,
because underlying earnings are considered a proxy for a firm’s ongoing profitability,
an approach that is useful for evaluation (AICD and FINSIA, 2009; KPMG, 2009).
Previous studies have found that managers can use their discretion in defining nonstatutory earnings (i.e., pro forma earnings) in an aggressive manner, considering
some actual recurring expenses non-recurring expenses to exclude for current
earnings determination, resulting in a firm with favourable pro forma earnings in the
context of the US (Bowen et al., 2005; Doyle et al., 2003, 2013; McVay et al., 2006).
By aggressively defining the pro forma earnings (shifting recurring expenses to nonrecurring items to make non-statutory earnings higher than GAAP earnings),
managers can achieve their personal interests with fewer costs than with real activities
and accruals-based earnings management. The joint policy guidance paper produced
by the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) and Financial Services
Institute of Australasia (FINSIA) argues that a long lead time in producing financial
statements makes non-statutory reporting necessary (AICD and FINSIA, 2009). The
publication of non-statutory reporting is termed underlying earnings, presented with a
reconciliation between statutory earnings and underlying earnings (AICD and
FINSIA, 2009; Sek and Taylor, 2011). As explained by the AICD and FINSIA (2009)
report, underlying earnings represent statutory profits adjusted to present a directors’
assessment of the results of the ongoing activities of the firm (p. 7). Australian
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) Regulatory Guidance 230 provides the
following statement in relation to non-IFRS (i.e., non-statutory profits) financial
information calculation: “A clear explanation should be provided about how the nonIFRS financial information is calculated” (ASIC, 2011b, p. 18). It further states in
relation to reconciliation, “A reconciliation between the non-IFRS and IFRS financial
information should be provided, separately itemising and explaining each significant
adjustment. When reconciling items are components of IFRS financial information,
7

they should be capable of being reconciled to the financial report. When a reconciling
item cannot be extracted directly from the financial report, the reconciliation should
show how the figure is calculated. When comparative non-IFRS financial information
is presented for a previous period, a reconciliation to the corresponding IFRS
financial information should be provided for that previous period” (ASIC, 2011b, p.
18). In implementing the guideline in practice, for instance, the BHP 2017 Annual
Report states under “Alternative performance measures” that “we use various
alternate performance measures to reflect our underlying performance. Our two
primary measures of performance are Underlying attributable profit and Underlying
EBITDA. These measures, and other alternate performance measures, are reconciled
below and defined in section 1.12.5” (BHP, 2017, p. 74, first paragraph).
There is no specific (Auditing Standard) requirement for external auditors “to
audit” underlying profits because these are non-IFRS profits. However, if a
Disclosure Reconciliation of Underlying Profits to Statutory Profits is presented, the
auditor must check the reasonableness of the reconciliation. In addition, ASA 720 The
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information addresses financial and nonfinancial information presented in Other Information (e.g., Annual Report) versus the
Financial Report (Financial Statements) as follows:
Paragraph 14 (p. 9). The auditor shall read the other information and, in doing so,
a.

Consider whether there is a material inconsistency between the other information
and the financial report. As the basis for this consideration, the auditor shall, to
evaluate their consistency, compare selected amounts or other items on other
information (that are intended to be the same as, to summarise, or to provide
greater detail about, the amounts or other items in the financial report) with such
amounts or other items in the financial report; and (Ref: Para. A25–A29)

b.

Consider whether there is a material inconsistency between the other information
and the auditor’s knowledge obtained in the audit, in the context of audit
evidence obtained and conclusions reached in the audit (Ref: Para. A30–A36).

Paragraph 15 (p. 9). While reading the other information in accordance with
paragraph 14 of this Auditing Standard, the auditor shall remain alert for indications
that the other information not related to the financial report or the auditor’s
8

knowledge obtained in the audit appears to be materially misstated (Ref: Para. A24,
A37–A38).
Also applicable is Scope of ASA 720 The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other
Information, per paragraphs 1–9 and the Objectives per paragraph 11 of the ASA720
Auditing Standard. Note paragraphs 2 and 3:
Paragraph 2 (p. 7): This Auditing Standard is written in the context of an audit of a
financial report by an independent auditor. Accordingly, the objectives of the auditor
in this Auditing Standard are to be understood in the context of the overall objectives
of the auditor as stated in paragraph 11 of ASA 200. The requirements in the
Australian Auditing Standards are designed to enable the auditor to achieve the
objectives specified in the Australian Auditing Standards, and thereby the overall
objectives of the auditor. The auditor’s opinion on the financial report does not cover
the other information; nor does this Auditing Standard require the auditor to obtain
audit evidence beyond that required to form an opinion on the financial report.
Paragraph 3 (p. 7): This Auditing Standard requires the auditor to read and consider
the other information because other information that is materially inconsistent with
the financial report or the auditor’s knowledge obtained in the audit can indicate that
there is a material misstatement of the financial report or that a material misstatement
of the other information exists, either of which can undermine the credibility of the
financial report and the auditor’s report thereon. Such material misstatements can also
inappropriately influence the economic decisions of the users for whom the auditor’s
report is prepared.
Moreover, unlike accrual-based earnings management and real activity earnings
management, bottom-line net income is unaffected by using aggressive non-statutory
earnings disclosure (Fan et al., 2010). Studies have found that when firms have
limited opportunities to engage in accruals and/or real activity earnings management,
they are more likely to aggressively disclose pro forma earnings (Black et al., 2014;
Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010).
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A few recent studies have examined underlying earnings disclosure in Australia. For
example, Sek and Taylor (2011) described how Australian banks report various
measures of underlying earnings over time. Cameron et al. (2012) demonstrated the
underlying earnings of the top 50 ASX-listed non-mining companies between 2007
and 2009. However, no studies have examined whether equity overvaluation serves as
an incentive for managers to alternate accrual-based earnings management and
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure. Furthermore, none have investigated the
effect of ASIC’s 2011 underlying earnings disclosure guidelines on managers’ use of
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain the overvaluation, or how firms’
corporate governance and ASIC underlying earnings disclosure guidelines affect the
decision-making of managers to use earnings management mechanisms to sustain the
equity overvaluation.
2.2. Agency theory of overvalued equity and earnings management
Several studies have examined earnings management behaviours based on the agency
theory of overvalued equity. Using a sample of US data from 1964 to 2003, Chi and
Gupta (2009) were the first to investigate the association between equity
overvaluation and accruals management and to examine how overvaluation-induced
earnings management affects a firm’s future performance. The authors found that
equity overvaluation intensifies accruals management, which confirms Jensen’s
(2005) conjecture that equity overvaluation encourages managers to manage earnings.
Houmes and Skantz (2010) demonstrated that overvalued equity is an incentive for a
manager’s share option compensation, regardless of other reasons for overvaluation.
Habib et al. (2013) examined the relationship between overvalued equity firms and
audit fees in the US context. Their results show that auditors charge higher audit fees
from clients that use aggressive earnings management because these firms have an
incentive to overvalue equity. Marciukaityte and Varma (2008) examined the agency
costs of overvaluating equity in earnings management by investigating a sample of
526 earnings management firms between 1990 and 2001. Their study found that
considerable overvaluation of equity pushes managers to manage earnings, but when
investors notice earnings restatements, managers correct the misstated overvaluation,
which results in a loss of confidence in the managers.
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Extending Marciukaityte and Varma (2008), Baderstcher (2011) focussed on the
degree and duration of overvaluation on the ‘evolution’ of earnings management,
from accruals management to manipulating real activities, to non-GAAP earnings
management. The study found that managers engage in accrual-based earnings
management at the early stage of overvaluation, then resort to real activity earnings
management to sustain their overvaluation. At the later stage of overvaluation,
managers are more likely to engage in non-GAAP earnings management. These
results suggest that equity overvaluation plays a significant role in managers choosing
alternative earnings management mechanisms during the duration of equity
overvaluation. Coulton et al. (2014) examined the extent to which overvalued equity
motivates firms to beat earnings benchmarks and whether beating the benchmark can
be interpreted as income-increasing earnings management. The authors provided
evidence that overvaluation-related incentives encourage earnings management and
that overvalued benchmark beaters have higher levels of abnormal accruals than do
other firms that beat benchmarks.
3. Development of hypotheses
Jensen (2005) proposed that the agency costs of overvalued equity stem from
managers who cannot (except through pure luck) produce earnings performance to
maintain an overvalued stock price without participating in earnings management
techniques. Managers manage earnings to avoid reporting a firm’s true value as lower
than expected earnings and thus be severely punished by the market (Skinner and
Sloan, 2002). According to the agency theory of overvalued equity, managers of
overvalued firms not only reject market correction of overvalued stock prices but also
tend to sustain overvaluation by engaging in earnings management that increases
reported earnings because overvaluation is an instant step towards increasing
managers’ welfare via incentives such as the bonuses and stock options that are
usually connected with firm performance (Badertscher, 2011). The underlying
assumption of this study, which builds on Jensen’s (2005) agency theory of
overvalued equity, is that equity overvaluation can lead to earnings management, and
managers are likely to use different earnings management mechanisms during the
duration of equity overvaluation.

11

There are many earnings management choices that managers can use to disguise true
economic performance and sustain equity overvaluation. The flexibility of accounting
reporting policy provides opportunities for managers to engage in earnings
management that makes the firm appear less risky or more profitable than it actually
is (Fields et al., 2001; Graham et al., 2005). In choosing the type of earnings
management to utilise, managers must consider the expected costs and benefits of
alternative earnings management mechanisms. Each accounting choice has its costs
and benefits, but the net incentives (benefits minus costs) will ultimately determine
management’s choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms (Desai et al.,
2006; Palmrose et al., 2004).
Accrual-based earnings management is a popular choice because it has no first-order
effect on cash flows and can be completed at the end of a period once the amount of
pre-accrual management earnings is known (Badertscher, 2011; Doukakis, 2014;
Gunny, 2010). However, accrual-based earnings management has limitations. First,
aggressive choices about accruals are at a higher risk of regulatory litigation and
scrutiny because accrual accounting choices are subject to auditor scrutiny, and high
levels of accrual manipulation tend to be detected by regulators (Graham et al., 2005),
particularly for publicly listed firms. Second, the reversing nature of accrual-based
earnings management can be problematic because a firm can reverse the previous
year’s accrual-based earnings management to influence the current year’s earnings
(Badertscher, 2011). The reversing nature of accruals can limit the flexibility in
applying accrual-based earnings management. Some studies argue that firms that used
accrual-based earnings management extensively in previous periods tend to use other
earnings management techniques in the current period, particularly if they have a
continued motivation to manage earnings (Alhadab et al., 2015; Gunny, 2010).
From a valuation perspective, if the probability of detecting an earnings management
technique as material misstatements is low, it is less costly than other earnings
management techniques (Badertscher et al., 2012). Aggressive underlying earnings
disclosure enables management to manage earnings by large amounts without
reversing them, thus enabling management to achieve specific benchmarks and
sustain overvalued equity (Badertscher, 2011; Black et al., 2014). However,
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure is not without costs. Studies find that
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aggressive non-statutory earnings reporting is an egregious form of earnings
management because share prices decline severely when investors detect
opportunistic non-statutory earnings reporting, decreasing managers’ reputations
(Desai et al., 2006; Graham et al., 2005; Mizik and Jacobson, 2007; Palmrose et al.,
2004).
Along with the agency theory of overvalued equity conjecture, this paper posits that
the duration of overvaluation affects managers’ decisions to use earnings management
mechanisms. Specifically, in the early stage of overvaluation, managers are more
likely to use accrual-based earnings management. Because accrual-based earnings
management has limitations, this paper argues that the longer the duration of a firm’s
equity overvaluation, the greater is the manager’s incentive to disclose underlying
earnings in an aggressive manner to sustain the overvalued equity. Therefore, the
following hypothesis is presented:
H1: The longer firms are overvalued, the more likely managers will disclose
underlying earnings aggressively.
The form of corporate governance that can reduce accrual-based earnings
management is not a new topic. Recent studies have focussed on examining whether
corporate governance has a moderating effect on the quality of non-GAAP reporting.
For example, Frankel et al. (2011) were the first to examine the relationship between
non-GAAP earnings and the percentage of independent directors on the board. Their
findings show that firms with a high percentage of independent directors on the board
exclude items from non-GAAP earnings, suggesting that companies with higher
corporate governance are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings efficiently.
However, their study does not provide direct evidence on whether firms with weak
corporate governance report non-GAAP earnings to mislead investors. Jennings and
Marques (2011) extend Frankel et al. (2011) by using two attributes of corporate
governance: percentage of shares held by institutions and percentage of independent
directors on the board. They provide strong evidence that corporate governance can
prevent investors from being misled by non-GAAP adjustments and earnings
disclosed in quarterly earnings announcement press releases. Entwistle et al. (2012)
examine whether firms with stronger credibility attributes (i.e., high corporate
governance, higher quality auditors, and higher historical information quality) are
13

perceived as providing more-credible non-GAAP exclusions than are firms with
weaker credibility attributes. These authors find that investors view better-governed
firms, firms audited by high-quality auditors, and higher historical information quality
firms as providing more-credible non-GAAP exclusions, and investors price the nonGAAP reporting firms with strong credibility attributes higher than those with poor
credibility attributes. Isidro and Marques (2014) find that a high-quality board can
restrain opportunistic management with non-GAAP earnings reporting behaviour,
particularly by reducing the opportunistic emphasis given to non-GAAP earnings
reporting in press releases.
The above studies provide evidence that corporate governance plays an important role
in monitoring and reducing management’s earnings management behaviour. Our
study attempts to examine whether corporate governance influences the decisionmaking of managers to choose earnings management mechanisms to sustain equity
overvaluation. Because this study is the first in Australia to investigate the influence
of corporate governance on managers’ use of different earnings management
mechanisms, hypothesis 2 is stated in null form below:

H2: Corporate governance does not influence managers’ choice to use earnings
management mechanisms.
Studies conducted in countries in which compliance with non-GAAP earnings
reporting is compulsory (e.g., the US), have found that the compulsory introduction of
non-GAAP guidelines can significantly increase the quality of non-GAAP earnings
reported. Opportunistic non-GAAP reporting is decreased (Bowen et al., 2005), and
misleading reporting practices are also decreased (Entwistle et al., 2006). The
probability that firms will disclose non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat forecasts
declines (Heflin and Hsu, 2008), and confidence in the market increases (Marques,
2006). Unlike in the US,2 there are no compulsory regulations that govern managers’
2

The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced Regulation G (Reg G), item 10(e) of
Regulation S-K , and item 12 to govern non-GAAP earnings reported outside financial statements in
2003. Reg G includes all of the public reporting of non-GAAP financial valuation containing
conference calls, press releases, presentations to investors, and other forms of media. To establish
transparency in calculating non-GAAP earnings, the regulation demands that the reporters reconcile
non-GAAP earnings with GAAP earnings. Although the SEC attempts to ensure non-GAAP earnings
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disclosure of underlying earnings in Australian firms. The ASIC issued its
Consultation Paper 150 in March 2011, proposing guidelines to minimise any
adverse effect that can result from firms’ underlying earnings disclosures. These
guidelines state the following: (i) managers should explain the calculation of
underlying earnings and why it is important to report underlying earnings; (ii) firms
should not give greater prominence to underlying earnings than to IFRS information;
(iii) managers should provide a reconciliation between underlying earnings and IFRS
earnings; and (iv) firms should consistently report underlying earnings (ASIC,
2011a). In December 2011, ASIC published its Regulatory Guide 230: Disclosing
Non-IFRS Financial Information as a guide to clarify reporting of underlying
earnings, with the aim of preventing users being misled by underlying earnings
reporting. ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 230 states that firms can disclose underlying
earnings in communications such as directors’ reports, press releases, notes to
financial statements, and analyst briefings, but that reporting should not mislead
financial statement users by giving greater prominence to underlying earnings than
IFRS earnings information. Firms can disclose underlying earnings when such
reporting assists in providing a true and fair view of financial statements. Firms must
also reconcile underlying earnings and IFRS earnings by showing and explaining
adjustments (ASIC, 2011b). These guidelines are similar to Reg G in the US;
however, it is mandatory for US firms that disclose underlying earnings to follow Reg
G, whereas it is voluntary for Australian firms that disclose underlying earnings to
follow the ASIC’s guidelines. This study examines the influence of the ASIC
guidelines on managers’ decisions to implement aggressive underlying earnings
disclosure and accrual-based earnings management. The third hypothesis is presented
in null form below:
H3: The ASIC underlying earnings disclosure guidelines do not influence managers’
choice to use earnings management mechanisms.

reporting is useful and has not been completed in a misguided manner, it does not prohibit non-GAAP
reporting (SEC, 2003).
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4. Research design
4.1. Data and sample selection
This study used a sample of ASX 200 firms from 2009 to 2016. Financial data were
obtained from the DatAnalysis database. ASX 200 firms were selected as the sample
frame because the ASX 200 is recognised as the primary investment benchmark in
Australia. ASX 200 firms cover approximately 78% of Australian equity market
capitalisation. This paper sets out to examine the post-IFRS period; therefore, 2006,
2007, and 2008 were avoided because in the three years following the adoption of
IFRS, many changes were made to financial reporting processes and systems in
Australian firms that were adopting IFRS standards. To collect the underlying
earnings data, we searched for information about underlying earnings in the annual
reports available in the Annual Reports Online database and DatAnalysis, using the
keywords underlying, adjusted, normalised, earnings before, profit before, and pro
forma. Following Black and Christensen (2009), we excluded EBIT and EBITDA
because they are commonly reported as standard steps in the income statement. Table
1 illustrates the detailed sample selection process. The study found that 658 firm-year
observations out of 927 firm-year observations in the sample disclosed underlying
earnings, and that 491 firm-year observations out of 927 firm-year observations in the
sample disclosed underlying earnings figures greater than statutory earnings figures
over eight observation years.
<Insert Table 1 about here>
4.2. Measurement of accrual-based earnings management
4.2.1. Accruals quality
The quality of accruals is very important in determining the reliability of earnings
information for users because high-quality earnings map more closely into cash flows
(Harris et al., 2000). Dechow and Dichev (2002) viewed the accruals matching
function to cash flows as very important because accruals expect future cash
collections/payments and reverse them when cash previously recognised in accruals is
received/paid. Thus, Dechow and Dichev (2002) proposed and tested the quality of
accruals based on the observation that the total current working capital accrual-based
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earnings maps into operating cash flows in the previous period, the current period,
and the next period. The unexplained portion of the variation in working capital
accruals is an inverse measure of accruals quality (a larger unexplained portion
indicates poorer quality), and the wider variation in the unexplained portion in
working capital accruals indicates low-quality accruals (Francis et al., 2005).
The measure of accruals quality used in this paper is based on Dechow and Dichev’s
(2002) measure, in which the unexplained portion of the variation in working capital
accruals is measured as the standard deviation in the residuals using a five-year
rolling window that ends in 2012 for firm j, year t in the following multivariate
equation (1):
TCAj,t = α0 + α1CFOj,t-1 + α2CFOj,t + α3CFOj,t+1 + vj,t (1)
where j is firm-year observation; t is time period from 2005 to 2012; TCAj,t is firm j’s
current accruals in year t, = (ΔCAj,t - ΔCLj,t -ΔCashj,t + ΔSTDj,t), scaled by the total
assets at the beginning of year t; CFOj,t is cash flow from operations in year t,
calculated as earnings before tax (Ej,t) less total accruals (TAj,t),3 scaled by the total
assets at the beginning of year t; and vj,t is residuals from Equation (1) representing
accrual quality (AQj,t).
4.2.2. Innate factors of firms and discretional accrual-based earnings management
Accruals quality is jointly determined by the relevance of underlying financial
performance and by the ability of the accounting system to measure performance
(Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore, accruals quality is affected by two factors: accruals
that reflect the innate features of firms and those that reflect discretionary sources.
Innate features are derived from business models and the operating risk and operating
environments. Previous studies have shown that innate factors account for
approximately 50% of variations in the accrual quality metric (Francis et al., 2005,
2008). Discretionary sources stem from the process of financial reporting and include
3

TAj,t = ΔCAj,t - ΔCLj,t - ΔCashj,t + ΔSTDj,t-DEPNj,t; ΔCAj,t = firm j’s change in current assets between
year t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; ΔCLj,t = firm j’s change in current
liabilities between year t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; ΔCashj,t = firm j’s
change in cash between year t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; ΔSTDj,t = firm
j’s change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of
year t; and DEPNj,t = firm j’s depreciation and amortisation expenses in year t, scaled by total assets at
the beginning of year t.
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the managerial financial reporting implementation decisions, judgements and
estimates, monitoring and governance, and regulatory scrutiny (Dechow et al., 2010;
Francis et al., 2005, 2008).
To separate the innate and discretionary accrual components from accrual quality, (i)
company size, (ii) standard deviation of cash flow from operations, (iii) standard
deviation of sales, (iv) length log operating cycle, (v) the incidence of earnings losses,
and (vi) earnings variability are selected as innate factors.4 Those six innate factors
are regressed on accruals quality (AQj,t) as follows:
AQj,t = a0 + a1Sizej,t + a2Opcyclej,t + a3NegEarnj,t + a4Cfoj,t + a5Salesj,t + a5SDEj,t +ej,t (2)
where j is firm-year observation, t is time period from 2009 to 2016; AQj,t is the
standard deviation of residuals from Equation (1) for firm j, year t-vj,t; Sizej,t is natural
logarithm of the total assets for firm j, year t; Opcyclej,t is natural logarithm of days of
accounts receivable plus days of inventory for firm j, year t; Cfoj,t is standard
deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total assets, computed
using a five-year rolling window until 2016 for firm j, year t; Salesj,t is standard
deviation of sales revenue scaled by beginning total assets, computed using a fiveyear rolling window until 2016 for firm j, year t; and NegEarnj,t is firm’s proportion
of losses over the previous five years for firm j, year t. SDEj,t is measured by the
standard deviation of earnings before tax using a five-year rolling window until 2016
for firm j, year t.
Consistent with Francis et al. (2005), Equation (2) is measured by cross-section by
industry for each year. Because the cross-sectional models require at least 10 firms in
one industry (Aldamen and Duncan, 2013), this study combined the three smallest
industry groups into one, giving a total of six industries for each year. The industry
type is based on the Global Industry Classification Standard industry sector. Eight
industries were included in the sample: energy, materials, industrials, consumer
discretionary, healthcare, software, telecommunication services, and utilities. The
4

Following Francis et al. (2005), this paper includes company size, standard deviation of cash flow
from operations, standard deviation of sales, length logarithm operating cycle and incidence of
earnings losses affecting accruals quality as firms’ innate factors. Previous studies have found that
earnings variability is highly related to accruals quality and suggests greater variability in earnings and
lower accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004, 2005). Therefore, earnings
variability is included as an innate factor affecting accruals quality.
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telecommunication services (six firms) and the utilities (six firms) were combined
into one group. Because it is a high-tech industry (three firms), software was included
in the healthcare category to measure cross-sectional Equation (2). 5 This paper
examines the influence of income-increasing accrual-based earnings management on
equity overvaluation and expects that when managers are less likely to use incomeincreasing accrual-based earnings management, they tend to use income-increasing
underlying exclusions to overvalue firms’ equity. Thus, following previous studies
(Baber et al., 2011; Laksmana and Yang, 2014), this paper measures the incomeincreasing accrual-based earnings management (InAMj,t) by a dummy variable such
that the positive residuals of Equation (2)-ej,t are coded as ‘1’, and ‘0’ otherwise. The
predicted values from Equation (2) are the estimated accruals’ innate factors of firms.
4.3. Measurement of overvaluation
Following Habib et al. (2013), this paper measures the value of equity using positive
lagged P/E ratios and positive lagged P/B ratios as proxy for equity overvaluation.6
The P/E ratio was traditionally used to value companies because P/E valuation is a
substitute for the well-established discounted earnings model. However, the
applicability of P/E ratios in valuation has been challenged by both practitioners and
academics (How and Howe, 2001; Kim and Ritter, 1999). Because transitory earnings
account for a large part of profits and an increasing number of firms engage in
earnings management, the usefulness of earnings in valuation declines (Collins et al.,
1997, 1999) due to issues connected with P/E ratios, in which P/B ratios have become
an increasingly important valuation price-multiple. Studies have shown that when the
equity’s book value is compared with dividends and earnings, the equity book value
had the highest explanatory power of empirical models (Collins et al., 1997, 1999).
However, because different firms identify various numbers of intangible assets on
their books, the price-multiple calculated using the book value of equity might not be

5

This paper follows Aldamen and Duncan’s (2013) measurement of industry type. In that study,
telecommunication services and utilities were combined into one industry group to measure the crosssectional model.
6

Empirical evidence shows that equity overvaluation is positively related to the subsequent incomeincreasing earnings management (Chi and Gupta, 2009), and highly valued firms tend to use
discretionary accruals to manage earnings upwards in the year following the overpricing (Houmes and
Skantz, 2010). This study, following Habib et al. (2013), uses lagged measurements. This paper also
trimmed the top and the bottom one per cent of the sample.
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applied to firms with different proportions of unrecognised intangible assets (How et
al., 2007, p. 106). Because the P/E ratios and P/B ratios have limitations, the valuation
of equity is measured by the average of lagged P/E ratios and lagged P/B ratios in this
paper.7 Using aggregative measurement by averaging the two is appropriate because
lagged P/E ratios and lagged P/B ratios present one factor (see Table 3, Panel B factor
analysis). This research design is framed to be consistent with Jensen’s (2005) view
that equity overvaluation drives managers to manipulate earnings (see Appendix for
variables’ proxy and measurement).
To identify equity-overvalued firms, firms are ranked based on the PEPBj,t ratio for
each year, where those firms in the highest quartile rank8 of PEPBj,t indicate equity
overvaluation. To capture the notion of sustained equity overvaluation or duration of
equity overvaluation, this paper identifies firms that have been in the top quartile of
PEPBj,t for 1 (Over1j,t), 2(Over2j,t), 3(Over3j,t), 4(Over4j,t), 5 or more than 5 (Over5j,t)
consecutive years.
4.4. Duration of equity overvaluation and earnings management (H1)
The models for testing H1 were designed as follows:
EMj,t=a0+∑b0-5Over(i)j,t+c1Controlsj,t+ c2Year effects +c3Industry effects +ej,t (3)
where j is firm-year observation, t is time period from 2009 to 2016.
Dependent variables: EMj,t is either InExj,t or InAMj,t. InExj,t is aggressive underlying
earnings disclosure measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm discloses an
underlying earnings number that is greater than the statutory earnings in year t, and 0
otherwise. InAMj,t is income-increasing accrual-based earnings management that
equals 1 if residuals (ej,t) of Equation (2) is positive, or 0 otherwise.
Independent variables: Over(i)j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if j firm has been in the
top quartile of PEPBj,t for (i) consecutive years, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, Over1j,t
equals 1 if j firm was overvalued for one year during the sample years, and 0
7

P/E ratios and P/B ratios have been ranked as high and low; the PEPB is the average of the rankings.

8

Unlike Badertscher (2011), this paper uses quartile value rather than quintile value due to the small
sample size. Therefore, following Habib et al. (2013), this paper measures overvalued equity using
quartile values.
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otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm was overvalued for two consecutive years during
the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm was overvalued for three
consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm
was overvalued for four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise.
Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm was overvalued for five or more than five consecutive years
during the sample years, and 0 otherwise.
Control variables: Following the literature, this paper includes several control
variables that influence the likelihood of firm equity overvaluation and earnings
management.
Accruals-specific controls: Following previous studies (Badertscher, 2011; Black et
al., 2014; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), this paper includes an indicator variable
Litigationj,t that equals 1 if j firm is in a high litigation risk industry to capture the
litigation penalties.9 This paper includes Litigationj,t as a specific control variable
because accrual-based earnings management is more likely than aggressive
underlying earnings disclosure to be detected and punished; thus, greater perceived
litigation penalties should decrease the tendency for accrual-based earnings
management.
Another specific control variable for accruals widely recorded in the accounting
literature is Big4 auditors. Following previous studies (Badertscher, 2011; Black et
al., 2014; Doukakis, 2014), this paper includes Big4j,t as a specific control variable
that is measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s auditor is a Big 4 audit
company, and 0 otherwise. This variable is included because previous studies suggest
that auditors play a monitoring role, and the presence of a Big 4 auditor restricts
accrual-based earnings management practices (Francis and Wang, 2008). It is
expected that increased scrutiny enhances the probability of discovering accrual-based
earnings management, but such scrutiny should not affect a manager’s decision to
aggressively disclose underlying earnings because it typically falls outside an
auditor’s responsibility.

9

Following Barton and Simko (2002) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), high-litigation industries are
pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, software, and service industries. Pharmaceuticals/biotechnology is a
sub-group of the healthcare sector.
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Underlying earnings-specific controls: Previous research indicates that meeting
earnings targets and avoiding current statutory losses is a useful means of explaining
pro forma earnings disclosures. These studies suggest that managers have strong
incentives to manipulate non-statutory earnings when firms miss their earnings targets
or experience current statutory earnings losses (Barth et al., 2012; Black and
Christensen, 2009; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010; Hitz, 2010; Isidro and
Marques, 2014). This paper includes the dummy variable Lossj,t, which equals 1 if j
firm experiences a current statutory earnings loss in year t, and 0 otherwise, whereas
the dummy variable Meetj,t equals 1 if j firm’s current statutory earnings are greater
than or equal to previous statutory earnings, and 0 otherwise.
General control variables include Leveragej,t (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994;
Doukakis, 2014; Francis and Wang, 2008); firm growth measured by market-to-book
ratio (MtoBj,t) and sales growth (SalesGj,t) (Black et al., 2014; Doyle et al., 2013;
Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Zang, 2012); firm profitability, measured by return of
equity (ROEj,t) (Doukakis, 2014; Doyle et al., 2007, 2013; Frankel et al., 2011); and
capital intensity (Capitalj,t) (Baginski et al., 1999; Francis et al., 2004). This study
also includes net operating assets at the beginning of the year as a control variable,
because previous net operating assets – which indicate the balance sheet constraints –
affect current managers’ decisions to use earnings management (Badertscher, 2011).
Net operating assets at the beginning of a year (NOAj,t) are measured by shareholders’
equity minus cash, cash equivalent, plus total debt, divided by lagged sales for firm j,
at the beginning of year t. Firm size (Mktcapj,t) is measured by the natural logarithm
of market capitalisation at the beginning of year t (Doukakis, 2014; Ettredge et al.,
2005; Lundholm and Myers, 2002). This paper includes the year and industry effects
to control the unobservable confounding variables that differ from time to time, but
are constant across industries, and the unobservable confounding variables that differ
across industries, but are constant over time. Corporate governance is measured by
the percentage of independent directors on the board (INDj,t) in relation to the total
number of directors on the board. We obtained corporate governance data from the
corporate governance section of the annual report of each firm.
This study includes underlying earnings disclosure or accrual-based earnings
management because control variables in previous studies indicated that accrual-
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based earnings management and non-statutory earnings disclosures are substitute
mechanisms of earnings management (Black et al., 2014; Cohen et al., 2008;
Doukakis, 2014; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010). If the dependent variable is
accrual-based earnings management (InAMj,t), then it controls for aggressive
underlying earnings disclosures (InExj,t); the converse also applies.
To examine the influence of corporate governance in H2, we divided our sample into
two sub-samples: firms with high corporate governance versus firms with low
corporate governance. Each year is ranked on INDj,t, and the upper quartile of INDj,t is
selected as a proxy of high corporate governance, whereas the lower quartile of INDj,t
is selected as a proxy of low corporate governance.
To examine H3 – that is, whether ASIC underlying earnings guidelines in 2011 would
affect managers’ decision-making in using different earnings management techniques
to sustain equity overvaluation – we examined the post-ASIC underlying earnings
guidelines period (2013–2016)10 and restricted our sample to the firms that disclosed
underlying earnings. Because the guidelines are voluntarily followed by firms, we
divided our sample into two sub-samples: firms that voluntarily conform to the
guidelines and firms that do not voluntarily conform to the guidelines to disclose
underlying earnings. If a firm conforms to all of ASIC’s guidelines – (i) firms explain
the calculation of underlying earnings and why it is important to report them; (ii)
firms do not provide greater prominence to underlying earnings than to IFRS
earnings; (iii) firms provide a reconciliation between underlying earnings and IFRS
earnings; and (iv) firms consistently report underlying earnings (ASIC, 2011a, 2011b)
– over the four reporting periods from 2013 to 2016, then the study considers the firm
compliant.
5. Analysis and results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 documents the descriptive statistics of the variables for earnings management
and equity overvaluation variables and shows the differences between the top and
bottom quartiles. For the earnings management mechanisms (InAMj,t: income10

We avoid 2011 and 2012 because we want to leave time for firms to familiarise themselves with the
guidelines.
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increasing accrual-based earnings management, and InExj,t: aggressive underlying
earnings disclosure), the median of InAMj,t (0.000) is lower than the median of InExj,t
(1.000), which means that sample firms are more likely to disclose underlying
earnings aggressively. Examining the overvaluation variables, the mean and median
of PEj,t (15.274 and 14.190, respectively) are higher than the mean and median of
PBj,t (2.607 and 1.830, respectively). The mean (median) of PBPEj,t is 8.940 (8.190),
with an interquartile range of (5.870) to (11.285).
<Insert Table 2 about here>
5.2. Pearson and Spearman correlations and factor analysis
Table 3, Panel A shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations of key variables.
InExj,t is significantly negatively correlated with InAMj,t under Spearman correlation
(correlation = -0.002, p-value = 0.046) and Pearson correlation (correlation = -0.043,
p-value = 0.040). These results confirm those of previous studies (Black et al., 2014;
Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010), in which accrual-based earnings
management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosures are substitute earnings
management mechanisms. Moving on to the correlations between earnings
management mechanisms and overvaluation measurements, InAMj,t is significantly
positively correlated to Over1j,t and Over2j,t under both the Pearson and Spearman
correlation tests. InExj,t is significantly positively correlated to Over3j,t, Over4j,t, and
Over5j,t under Pearson and Spearman correlations. Table 3, Panel B presents the factor
analysis for measuring overvaluation and indicates that the PE and PB ratios represent
one factor. Therefore, this paper appropriately combines the two measurement ratios
into one variable to represent a firm’s valuation measurement.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
5.3. Regression results
5.3.1. Results for duration of overvaluation and earnings management mechanisms
(H1)
Table 4 shows the results of H1 using the time-industry fixed-effects logit regression
model. The first and second models are tested with dependent InAMj,t and InExj,t,

24

respectively. The results of the first model show that InAMj,t is significantly positively
related to Over1j,t (coefficient = 0.571, p-value = 0.025) and to Over2j,t (coefficient =
1.507, p-value = 0.065), whereas Over3j,t Over4j,t, and Over5j,t are not significantly
associated with InAMj,t. The results of the first model suggest that in the early stage of
overvaluation, firms are more likely to engage in income-increasing accrual-based
earnings management. In the later stage of overvaluation, managers are less likely to
use income-increasing accrual-based earnings management, which could be explained
by the reversing nature of accrual-based earnings management, in which managers’
ability to use income-increasing accrual-based earnings management decreases. The
second model demonstrates that InExj,t is significantly positively associated with
Over3j,t (coefficient = 0.877, p-value = 0.007), Over4j,t (coefficient = 1.007, p-value =
0.027), and Over5j,t (coefficient = 0.939, p-value = 0.002); thus, after a firm has been
overvalued in the early stage using income-increasing earnings management, firms
tend to sustain their equity overvaluation by engaging in aggressive underlying
earnings disclosure to define underlying earnings as higher than statutory earnings.
The results of Table 4 demonstrate that after an extended period of equity
overvaluation, firms are unable to engage in further accrual-based earnings
management and therefore resort to disclosing underlying earnings aggressively.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
5.3.2. Influence of corporate governance on managers’ choice to use earnings
management mechanisms (H2)
Table 5 shows the time-industry fixed-effects logit regression results for H2. The first
and second models show the results of firms with high corporate governance (i.e., a
high proportion of independent directors), whereas the third and fourth models show
the results of firms with low corporate governance (i.e., a low proportion of
independent directors). The results show that for the high corporate governance firms,
only Over1j,t is very weakly significant and positively related with InAMj,t (coefficient
= 0.866, p-value = 0.096); however, Over4j,t and Over5j,t are significantly positively
associated with InExj,t (coefficient = 0.057, p-value = 0.043; coefficient = 0.232, pvalue = 0.020, respectively). In the low corporate governance firms, InAMj,t is
significantly positively related with Over1j,t (coefficient = 2.110, p-value = 0.053),
Over2j,t (coefficient = 1.572, p-value = 0.022), Over3j,t (coefficient = 2.493, p-value =
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0.004), and over4j,t (coefficient = 2.058, p-value = 0.010); InExj,t is significantly
positively associated with Over3j,t (coefficient = 2.176, p-value = 0.034), Over4j,t
(coefficient = 0.112, p-value = 0.049), and Over5j,t (coefficient = 0.586, p-value =
0.000). The results suggest that corporate governance could constrain managers to
apply accrual-based earnings management to sustain the early years of equity
overvaluation but could not restrain managers from using aggressive underlying
earnings disclosure in the later years of equity overvaluation. Specifically, the
managers in high corporate governance firms sustain the later stage of equity
overvaluation by aggressive underlying earnings disclosure. The managers in low
corporate governance firms apply both earnings management mechanisms to sustain
equity overvaluation.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
5.3.3. Influence of ASIC underlying earnings guidelines on using earnings
mechanisms (H3)
Table 6 shows the year industry fixed-effects logit regression results for H3. Because
ASIC guidelines are voluntarily followed by reporting firms, we investigate two subsamples (i.e., firms that conform to ASIC guidelines and firms that do not conform to
ASIC guidelines) to understand the influence of the guidelines on managers’ choice
of earnings management to sustain overvaluation. We focus on the post-ASIC period
(i.e., 2013–2016) and limit our analysis to the observations that disclose underlying
earnings to test H3. The first and second models present the results for the sample
with the observations that conform to ASIC underlying earnings disclosure
guidelines, whereas the third and fourth models show the results for the sample with
the observations that do not conform to ASIC underlying earnings disclosure
guidelines. The results show that for the compliant firms, only Over2j,t is significantly
positively associated with InExj,t (coefficient = 0.897, p-value = 0.046); none of the
other overvaluations are related to either InAMj,t or InExj,t. For the non-compliant
firms, InAMj,t is significantly positively related to Over1j,t (coefficient = 4.102, p-value
= 0.050), Over2j,t (coefficient = 2.778, p-value = 0.003), and Over3j,t (coefficient =
0.313, p-value = 0.061); InExj,t is significantly positively associated with Over2j,t
(coefficient = 1.442, p-value = 0.007), Over3j,t (coefficient = 2.797, p-value = 0.003),
and Over4j,t (coefficient = 0.983, p-value = 0.056). The results suggest that firms that
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conform to the ASIC guidelines are less likely to use earnings mechanisms to sustain
equity overvaluation, whereas non-compliant firms use both accrual-based earnings
management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain equity
overvaluation.
<Insert Table 6 about here>
6. Additional tests
6.1. Limited ability using accrual-based earnings management
To provide further evidence on how earnings management choices interact as the
duration of overvaluation increases, this study examines a subset of firms that are
likely to be constrained in their ability to manage earnings through accruals.
According to Jensen (2005), the duration of overvaluation motivates managers to
engage in different earnings management techniques. This paper assumes that if the
firm has a limited ability to use accrual-based earnings management, the firm will
more likely engage in aggressive underlying earnings disclosure. We expect that
accrual-based earnings management-constrained firms are more likely to engage in
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain overvaluation.
Because overvalued firms decide to manage reported earnings, this section
investigates whether the constraints of using accrual-based earnings management
would encourage managers to disclose underlying earnings or to disclose them in an
aggressive manner. Due to the constrained flexibility of accruals, the ability of
managers to manage accruals upwards in the current period is limited by accrual
management activities in previous periods. This paper follows previous studies
(Badertscher, 2011; Barton and Simko, 2002; Zang, 2012), in which net operating
assets (NOAj,t) are used as a proxy for the extent of accruals management in previous
periods to represent a firm’s ability to manage earnings using accruals. If the net
operating assets at the beginning of the year are high, managers’ abilities to use
accruals to manipulate earnings are reduced in the current year because the balance
sheet and income statement are articulated. Therefore, abnormal accruals shown in
past earnings can also be shown in net assets; hence, the latter are overstated when
firms have practised accrual management previously (Barton and Simko, 2002; Black
et al., 2014; Zang, 2012). Because the underlying earnings exclusions do not include a
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practical accounting system entry (there are no debit and credit adjustments required),
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure is not necessarily constrained by the
balance sheet, as accruals would be (Doyle et al., 2013).
To investigate whether firms with constraints on engaging accrual-based earnings
management are more likely to disclose underlying earnings aggressively to sustain
the equity overvaluation, this section focusses on a sub-sample of firms that are
constrained in their ability to engage in accrual-based earnings management. This
sub-sample is measured by net operating assets (NOAj,t). High values of NOAj,t
represent low ability to manipulate earnings using accruals in the current year. To
calculate the high values of NOAj,t, each year is ranked on NOAj,t, and the upper
quartile of NOAj,t is selected as a proxy of accruals constraining firms.
These results (presented in Table 7) indicate that firms with limited accrual-based
earnings management options do not engage in accrual-based earnings management.
As the duration of overvaluation increases, they disclose underlying earnings
aggressively to maintain overvaluation. Specifically, the first model finds that Over2j,t
is significantly negatively associated with InAMj,t (coefficient = -0.205, p-value =
0.020),11 and the second model finds that InExj,t is significantly positively associated
with Over2j,t (coefficient = 0.515, p-value = 0.042), Over3j,t (coefficient = 0.790, pvalue = 0.008), Over4j,t (coefficient = 1.855, p-value = 0.042), and Over5j,t (coefficient
= 0.807, p-value =0.000). The results in Table 7 suggest that if accrual-constrained
firms find it difficult to apply accrual-based earnings management, they tend to
disclose underlying earnings aggressively to sustain the overvaluation.
<Insert Table 7 about here>

11

We have found that the coefficient of OVER on InAM (income-increasing accrual earnings
management) turns negative (after Over1) when there is a high level of accrual earnings management
constraints. This result differs from Badertscher’s (2011) for the following two reasons: first, InAM is
a dummy variable; second, there are significant variations between Australia and the US in relation to
market competition, firm characteristics, economic structure, governance environment, and major
industries. For example, Australia follows a principle-based balance sheet-oriented conceptual
framework in accounting judgement, a common law legal system, a high level of shareholder
protection, and low conformity between taxation reporting and financial accounting; in addition, there
are some differences with the US in terms of regulatory and reporting environments (Chalmers et al.,
2008, 2011; Lont et al., 2010).
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7. Conclusion
This study tests and extends the assumption developed by Jensen’s (2005) agency
theory of overvalued equity. The purposes of this paper are as follows: first, to
examine whether the duration of overvaluation affects managers’ choice to use
accrual-based earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosure;
second, to investigate the influences of corporate governance on managers’ choice to
use different earnings management mechanisms to sustain the equity overvaluation;
and third, to examine the effects of the ASIC underlying reporting guidelines on
managers’ choice to use different earnings management mechanisms to sustain the
equity overvaluation. Jensen (2005) predicts that overvaluation leads managers to
engage in alternative earnings management techniques to sustain the firm’s
overvalued equity. This paper provides evidence that is consistent with this reasoning,
finding that overvalued firms engage in accrual-based earnings management in the
early stage. As overvaluation continues, overvalued firms are more likely to disclose
underlying earnings and to do so in an aggressive manner to maintain the
overvaluation. Furthermore, this paper finds that in firms with low corporate
governance, managers are more likely to use both earnings management techniques to
sustain equity overvaluation, whereas in firms with high corporate governance,
managers do not apply accrual-based earnings management, although they
nevertheless

disclose

underlying

earnings

aggressively

to

sustain

equity

overvaluation. Finally, this study shows that firms that do not conform to the ASIC
guidelines are more likely to sustain the overvaluation by using both earnings
management techniques, whereas this behaviour is not observed in firms that conform
to the ASIC guidelines. Additional tests demonstrate that when managers are
constrained by using accrual-based earnings management, they will only engage in
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain the overvaluation.
Two limitations should be considered when interpreting the results. First, aggressive
underlying earnings disclosure is new in the earnings management literature. Due to a
lack of guidance found in the literature, the control variables of underlying earnings
might not have comprehensively explained underlying earnings disclosure. This paper
focussed on the managers’ choice to use accrual-based earnings management or
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure. A future study can examine the influence
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of real activities of earnings management on aggressive underlying earnings
disclosure. Second, although we use models of time-industry effects to control for the
unobservable confounding variables that differ from time to time and for
unobservable confounding variables that differ across industries, we could not fully
control for all other unobservable variables that influence the explanatory variables.
The results of this paper provide several avenues for future research. First, because
the paper only examined the relationship between overvaluation and managers’
decisions to use accrual-based earnings management and underlying earnings
disclosure, researchers can extend the effect of the real activity earnings management
on overvaluation and managers’ choices to use accrual-based earnings management,
real activities earnings management, and underlying earnings disclosure. Second,
future research could also examine the factors that cause firms to become overvalued
and the interventions that can mitigate the agency costs of overvalued equity, such as
the roles of governments, regulators, and interventions that constrain pernicious
earnings management.
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Results tables
Table 1: sample selection
Sample selection
Firm-year observations
Top ASX200 firms

1200

Exclusions:
Banks

24

Insurance

16

Diversified financials

36

Real estate

76

Missing data

121

Final group investigated

927

Underlying earnings reporting

658

Reported underlying earnings
are greater than statutory
earnings

491

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for variables
Variable

Observation

Mean

LowQ

Median

TopQ

Std. Dev.

InAMj,t

927

0.406

0.000

0.000

1.000

0.491

InExj,t

927

0.530

0.000

1.000

1.000

0.499

INDj,t

927

0.697

0.600

0.750

0.833

0.171

PEj,t

927

15.274

10.150

14.190

18.970

8.541

PBj,t

927

2.607

1.120

1.830

3.080

2.379

PBPEj,t

927

8.940

5.870

8.190

11.285

4.759

Note: InAMj,t is positive of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents
income-increasing accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals
1 if j firm discloses underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. INDj,t is
percentage of independent directors on the board. PEj,t is price-to-earnings ratio for j firm in year t, which is
collected from DatAnalysis database. PBj,t is price-to-book ratio for j firm in year t, which is collected from
DatAnalysis database. PBPEj,t is average of PEj,t and PBj,t for firm j in year t.
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Table 3: Pearson and Spearman correlations and factor analysis
Table 3 Panel A: Pearson and Spearman correlations for variables
InAMj,t
InAMj,t

InExj,t

1.000

-0.043

**

(0.040)
InExj,t

-0.002

**

1.000
0.176***

0.021
(0.524)

Over1j,t
Over2j,t
Over3j,t
Over4j,t
Over5j,t

0.023

Over1j,t

Over2j,t

0.021

**

**

0.030

(0.525)
0.168

(0.046)
INDj,t

INDj,t

***

(0.048)
*

(0.640)

(0.518)

**

**

(0.029)

(0.035)

(0.001)

-0.022

-0.016

-0.089***

-0.008

(0.083)

(0.504)

(0.619)

(0.006)

(0.816)

1.000

-0.019

-0.013

-0.017

-0.057*

(0.529)

(0.658)

(0.564)

(0.052)

1.000

-0.016

-0.021

-0.071**

(0.583)

(0.473)

(0.016)

1.000

-0.015

-0.050*

(0.614)

(0.090)

1.000

-0.065**

(0.116)
-0.024

-0.021

(0.029)

(0.081)

(0.472)

(0.527)

-0.021

-0.015

-0.019

0.008

0.036

(0.810)

(0.027)

(0.518)

(0.657)

(0.572)

0.015

0.019**

-0.066**

-0.019

-0.025

(0.659)

(0.045)

(0.043)

(0.555)
**

-0.003

-0.065

(0.929)

(0.047)

-0.017

(0.453)
-0.082

**

(0.012)

0.004

0.066***

(0.075)

0.002*

0.035

(0.226)

0.057*

(0.750)

(0.865)
(0.002)
p-value in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

0.036

(0.620)

0.071**

0.104

0.019

1.000

(0.042)

0.006

0.014

(0.000)

0.052

***

Over5j,t

0.009

0.010

**

Over4j,t

0.015

(0.000)

**

(0.045)

0.058

Over3j,t

(0.598)
-0.058

*

(0.077)

(0.027)
-0.077

**

1.000

(0.019)

Pearson (above) and Spearman (below) correlations
Table 3 Panel B: Factor analysis for overvaluation variables
Factor

Eigenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1 (PB ratios)

1.182

0.365

0.5912

0.5912

Factor2 (PE ratios)

0.818

0.000

0.4088

1.0000

Number of obs

927

Retained factors

1

Number of params

1

chi2(1)

31.62

Prob>chi2

0

Note: Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued for one year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals
1 if j firm is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm
is overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued five or more than five consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. InAMj,t is positive
of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents income-increasing
accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm discloses
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. INDj,t is percentage of independent
directors on the board.
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Table 4: Regression results for overvaluation and earnings management
(H1)
InAMj,t as dependent variable
Coef.
Over1j,t
Over2j,t
Over3j,t

0.571

**

1.507

*

0.912

InExj,t as dependent variable

z

P>z

Coef.

2.240

0.025

0.177

1.850
1.200

0.065
0.293

z

P>z

0.300

0.763

0.783

*

1.670

0.096

0.877

***

2.690

0.007

2.210

0.027

3.090

0.002

-2.930

0.003

6.760

0.000

-3.950

0.000

2.960

0.003

-0.400

0.687

-3.010

0.003

Over4j,t

-0.185

-0.290

0.225

1.007

**

Over5j,t

-0.125

-0.400

0.464

0.939

***

-2.110

0.035

-1.560

0.119

AM specific
Big4j,t

-0.888

Litigationj,t

-0.952

**

UE specific
Meetj,t

-0.514

Lossj,t

1.786

***

***

General controls
InExj,t

-0.766

***

-3.920

0.000

InAMj,t

-0.767

***

Leveragej,t

0.486

1.130

0.257

1.413

SalesGj,t

-0.158

-0.410

0.680

-0.146

MtoBj,t

-0.111

-1.550

0.121

-0.154

***

2.610

0.009

0.095

1.640

0.101

*

1.880

0.060

0.002

0.240

0.807

Mktcapj,t

0.183

***

NOAj,t

-0.275

ROEj,t

-0.002

-0.410

0.685

0.003

1.390

0.164

Capitalj,t

0.046

0.210

0.831

-0.139

-0.790

0.427

***

3.690

0.000

**

-2.440

0.015

INDj,t

0.368

0.670

0.489

1.761

-0.600

Year effects

YES

YES

Industry effects

YES

YES

Number of obs

927

927

28.30%

17.00%

2

-0.690

0.502

_cons

Pseudo R
*

***

-1.642

p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if
j firm is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued five or more than five consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. InAMj,t is positive
of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents income-increasing
accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm discloses
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. Sizej,t is natural logarithm of the
total assets for firm j, year t; Opcyclej,t is natural logarithm of days of accounts receivable plus days of inventory
for firm j, year t; Cfoj,t is standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total assets,
computed using a 5-year rolling window ended in year 2012 for firm j, year t; Salesj,t is standard deviation of sales
revenue scaled by beginning total assets, computed using a 5-year rolling window ended in 2012 for firm j, year t;
NegEarnj,t is firm’s proportion of losses over the prior 5 years for firm j, year t. Big4j,t equals 1 if j firm is audited
by Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. SDEj,t is measured by standard deviation of earnings before tax using a 5-year
rolling window ending in 2012 for firm j, year t. Litigationj,t equals 1 if j firm is in pharmaceuticals/biotechnology,
software, or services industries, and 0 otherwise. Meetj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings
before tax in year t is greater than or equals to earnings before tax in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. Lossj,t is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if j firm reports statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. MtoBj,t is the market-to-book
equity ratio for firm j in year t. ROEj,t is earnings before tax divided by average equity for firm j in year t.
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Leveragej,t is measured by short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, year t. NOAj,t is
measured by shareholders’ equity less cash and cash equivalent plus total debt at the beginning of the year divided
by lagged sales. SalesGj,t is the sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm j, year t-1, then divided by the sales
for firm j, year t. MktCapj,t is measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the firm at the
beginning of year t for firm j. Capitalj,t is capital intensity measured by the ratio of net book value of property,
plant, and equipment to total assets for firm j, year t. INDj,t is percentage of independent directors on the board.
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Table 5: Regression results for impact of corporate governance on overvaluation
and earnings management (H2)

Over1j,t

Firms with a high proportion of
independent directors on the board

Firms with a low proportion of
independent directors on the board

InAM

InEx

InAM

InEx

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

-0.833

2.110

(0.317)

(0.053)

0.866

*

(0.096)
Over2j,t

Over3j,t

Over4j,t

Over5j,t

**

**

1.379

0.118

1.572

(0.284)

(0.697)

(0.022)
2.493

***

-1.243

0.848

(0.611)

(0.974)

(0.004)

**

**

1.425

0.057

(0.272)

(0.043)
**

0.359

0.232

(0.400)

(0.020)

2.058

0.067
(0.931)
0.453
(0.476)
2.176

**

(0.034)
0.112

**

(0.010)

(0.049)

0.641

0.586

(0.551)

(0.000)

***

AM specific
Big4j,t

Litigationj,t

1.981

**

0.571

(0.025)

(0.478)

2.706

-0.081

(0.988)

(0.943)

UE specific
Meetj,t

Lossj,t

*

-0.123

-0.699

(0.636)

(0.084)

0.923

***

1.025

(0.002)

**

(0.060)

General controls
InExj,t

-0.689

**

0.477

(0.049)
InAMj,t

(0.304)
-0.886

**

-0.514

(0.012)
Leveragej,t

SalesGj,t

MtoBj,t

1.603

**

0.852

0.737

(0.042)

(0.245)

(0.350)

(0.370)

-0.111

0.008

0.225

0.796

(0.481)

(0.933)

(0.772)

0.019

0.013

-0.495

(0.836)
Mktcapj,t

0.220

**

(0.038)
NOAj,t

ROEj,t

Capitalj,t

(0.343)
0.364

***

***

(0.004)
-0.397

*

(0.260)
-0.100
(0.487)
0.083

(0.000)

(0.076)

0.002

-0.566

(0.096)

(0.797)

(0.093)

(0.723)

0.004

0.009

0.007

-0.020

(0.648)

(0.940)

(0.664)

(0.410)

0.058

0.458

0.625

-0.236

(0.256)

(0.614)

2.140

0.368

(0.323)

(0.815)

-0.008

*

(0.716)
_cons

(0.272)

0.573

-5.017

***

(0.000)

***

(0.002)
-3.929

***

(0.000)

*

(0.587)
0.054
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Table 5 continued

*

Year effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Industry effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Number of obs

232

232

232

232

Pseudo R2

42.4%

21.2%

39.0%

17.7%

p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 p-value in parentheses

Note: Over0j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued once during the sample years from 2009 to 2012, and 0 otherwise.
Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm
is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued five or more than five consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. InAMj,t is positive
of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents income-increasing
accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm discloses
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. Big4j,t equals 1 if j firm is audited by
Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Litigationj,t equals 1 if j firm is in pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, software, or
services industries, and 0 otherwise. Meetj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings before tax in year
t is greater than or equal to earnings before tax in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. Lossj,t is a dummy variable that equals
1 if j firm reports statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. MtoBj,t is the market-to-book equity ratio for firm j
in year t. ROEj,t is earnings before tax divided by average equity for firm j in year t. Leveragej,t is measured by
short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, year t. NOAj,t is measured by shareholders’ equity
less cash and cash equivalent plus total debt at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales. SalesGj,t is the
sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm j, year t-1, then divided by the sales for firm j, year t. MktCapj,t is
measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the firm at the beginning of year t for firm j.
Capitalj,t is capital intensity measured by the ratio of net book value of property, plant, and equipment to total
assets for firm j, year t.
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Table 6: Regression results for impact of ASIC underlying earnings disclosure
guidelines on overvaluation and earnings management (H3)

Over1j,t

Over2j,t

Over3j,t

Over4j,t

Firms that voluntarily conform to the
guidelines

Firms that do not voluntarily
conform to the guidelines

InAM

InEx

InAM

InEx

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

0.907

0.269

4.102

(0.256)

(0.537)

(0.050)

**

1.167

0.897

(0.162)

(0.046)

2.778

**

***

(0.003)
*

1.095
(0.463)
1.442

***

(0.007)
2.797

***

0.529

0.272

0.313

(0.537)

(0.556)

(0.061)

(0.003)

1.543

-1.138

-0.596

0.983

(0.397)

(0.113)

(0.455)

(0.056)

**

AM specific
Big4j,t

-0.571

**

-0.204

(0.025)
Litigationj,t

-2.116

(0.820)

***

-2.870

(0.002)

***

(0.002)

UE specific
Meetj,t

Lossj,t

***

-0.624

-1.085

(0.211)

(0.004)

3.189

***

2.650

(0.000)

***

(0.000)

General controls
InExj,t

1.839

-1.764
(0.268)

InAMj,t

Leveragej,t

SalesGj,t

MtoBj,t

Mktcapj,t

ROEj,t

Capitalj,t

_cons

**

1.522

(0.611)

(0.018)

**

(0.818)

(0.014)

(0.773)

0.489

0.753

-3.195

(0.911)

(0.599)

(0.051)

(0.358)

0.469

0.091

-0.100

-0.241

(0.479)

(0.653)

(0.476)

(0.006)

0.433

-0.127

0.445

-0.067

(0.577)

(0.125)

-1.787

**

2.880

**

5.010

0.702
*

**

(0.015)
0.731
***

(0.576)

0.331

-0.793

(0.041)

(0.162)

(0.031)

(0.928)

0.005

0.005

-0.006

0.006

(0.850)

(0.434)

(0.659)

(0.257)

8.492

0.479

0.272

-1.362

(0.764)

(0.810)

(0.047)

0.187

4.831

1.071

(0.015)

(0.910)

(0.162)

(0.226)

-8.771

1.382

-1.868

2.808

(0.114)

(0.499)

(0.450)

(0.027)

(0.158)
INDj,t

(0.018)
-0.581

0.931

(0.504)
NOAj,t

**

-8.646

**

0.001

**

**
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Table 6 continued
Year effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Industry effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Number of obs

152

152

187

187

31.9%

29.4%

Pseudo R2

*

47.0%
26.6%
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 p-value in parentheses

Note: Over0j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued once during the sample years from 2009 to 2012, and 0 otherwise.
Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm
is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued five or more than five consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. InAMj,t is positive
of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents income-increasing
accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm discloses
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. Big4j,t equals 1 if j firm is audited by
Big 4 auditors, ad 0 otherwise. Litigationj,t equals 1 if j firm is in pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, software, or
services industries, and 0 otherwise. Meetj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings before tax in year
t is greater than or equal to earnings before tax in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. Lossj,t is a dummy variable that equals
1 if j firm reports statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. MtoBj,t is the market-to-book equity ratio for firm j
in year t. ROEj,t is earnings before tax divided by average equity for firm j in year t. Leveragej,t is measured by
short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, year t. NOAj,t is measured by shareholders’ equity
less cash and cash equivalent plus total debt at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales. SalesGj,t is the
sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm j, year t-1, then divided by the sales for firm j, year t. MktCapj,t is
measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the firm at the beginning of year t for firm j.
Capitalj,t is capital intensity measured by the ratio of net book value of property, plant, and equipment to total
assets for firm j, year t. Limit the observations that report underlying earnings from 2013 to 2016 (total 339; 38
firms conform to guidelines over four years, leaving 187 observations as non-compliance firms).
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Table 7: Regression results for additional analysis (limited ability of using
accrual-based earnings management)
InAMj,t as dependent variable

InExj,t as dependent variable

Coef.

z

P>z

Coef.

z

P>z

Over1j,t

0.726

1.190

0.138

0.629

0.070

0.393

Over2j,t

-0.205**

4.190

0.020

0.515**

2.040

0.042

0.790

***

5.850

0.008

1.855

**

2.040

0.042

0.807

***

5.980

0.000

-0.880

0.378

4.060

0.000

-0.422

-1.240

0.216

0.970

0.332

0.190

0.850

-2.275

Over3j,t

-1.613

Over4j,t

1.535

Over5j,t

2.710
-1.040

0.950
0.297

1.200

0.230

-0.910

0.360

1.960

0.050

AM specific

-0.804

Big4j,t

2.204

Litigationj,t

**

UE specific

-0.345

Meetj,t

3.267

Lossj,t

***

General controls

-0.708**

InExj,t

-2.200

0.028

InAMj,t

*

Leveragej,t

1.037

1.060

0.287

1.012

SalesGj,t

-0.586

-0.760

0.450

0.160
***

MtoBj,t

0.005

0.020

0.984

-0.783

-3.070

0.002

Mktcapj,t

0.020

0.150

0.881

0.445***

2.910

0.004

ROEj,t

-0.610

-0.310

0.754

-0.409

-0.200

0.844

2.880

0.004

***

Capitalj,t

-0.477

-1.280

0.201

1.194

INDj,t

-1.156

-1.200

0.230

0.798

0.780

0.435

_cons.

-5.980

-1.380

0.166

-1.390

0.730

0.467

Year effects

YES

YES

Industry effects

YES

YES

Number of obs

232

232

Pseudo R2

47.00%

24.50%

p < 0.10,

**

p < 0.05,

***

p < 0.01

Note: Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if
j firm is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm is
overvalued five or more than five consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. InAMj,t is positive
of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents income-increasing
accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm discloses
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. Big4j,t equals 1 if j firm is audited by
Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Litigationj,t equals 1 if j firm is in pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, software, or
services industries, and 0 otherwise. Meetj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings before tax in year
t is greater than or equal to earnings before tax in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. Lossj,t is a dummy variable that equals
1 if j firm report statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. MtoBj,t is the market-to-book equity ratio for firm j
in year t. ROEj,t is earnings before tax divided by average equity for firm j in year t. Leveragej,t is measured by
short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, year t. SalesGj,t is the sales for firm j, year t minus
the sales for firm j, year t-1, then divided by the sales for firm j, year t. MktCapj,t is measured as the natural
logarithm of the market capitalisation of the firm at the beginning of year t for firm j. Capitalj,t is capital intensity
measured by the ratio of net book value of property, plant, and equipment to total assets for firm j, year t.
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Appendix one
Variables definitions and measurements
Variable

Proxy

Measurement

Dependent variables
InAMj,t

InExj,t

Income increasing earnings included in
accrual-based earnings management

Dummy variable, positive abnormal accruals

Aggressive underlying earnings

Dummy variable, underlying earnings greater
than statutory earnings is coded as ‘1’and ‘0’
otherwise

are coded as ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise

Independent variables H1
Over1j,t
Over2j,t

Market-based equity is overvalued for

Dummy variable, overvalued for one year,

one year, during the sample years

equals ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise

Market-based equity is overvalued for

Dummy variable, overvalued for two

two consecutive years, during the

consecutive years, equals ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise

sample years
Over3j,t

Market-based equity is overvalued for

Dummy variable, overvalued for three

three consecutive years, during the

consecutive years, equals ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise

sample years
Over4j,t

Market-based equity is overvalued for

Dummy variable, overvalued for four

four consecutive years, during the

consecutive years, equals ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise

sample years
Independent variable H2
INDj,t

Extent of independent directors on
board

Percent of independent directors over total
directors of firm j in year t

Control variables – accruals management specific
Big4j,t

Large four audit firms

Dummy variable, 1 if j firm is audited by Big 4
auditors, 0 otherwise

The risk of security litigation
Litigationj,t

Dummy variable, 1 if j firm is in
pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, software, or
services industries, 0 otherwise

Control variables – underlying earnings specific
Meeting earnings targets
Meetj,t

Dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s
earnings before tax in year t is greater than or
equal to earnings before tax in year t-1, and 0
otherwise
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Lossj,t

Earnings loss situation

Dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm reports
statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise

Control variables – general
PEj,t

The growth potential of the firm

Price-to-earnings ratio for j firm in year t

PBj,t

The extent of over- or under-valuation
of stock price

Price-to-book ratio for j firm in year t

PBPEj,t

Average of price-to-earnings ratio and
price-to-book ratio

The average of PEj,t and PBj,t for firm j in year
t

Ability to meet financial obligations

Short-term and long-term debt divided by total
assets for firm j in year t

Sales growth

Sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm
j, year t-1, then divided by the sales for firm j,
in year t

Firm growth

Market-to-book equity ratio for firm j, in year t

A market-based firm size

Natural logarithm of the market capitalisation
of the firm at the beginning of year t for firm j

The extent of earnings management in
previous periods using accruals

Shareholders’ equity less cash and cash
equivalent plus total debt at the beginning of
the year divided by lagged sales for firm j

Profitability of firm

Earnings before tax divided by average equity
for firm j in year t

Ability to use assets to generate
revenue

Capital intensity measured by the ratio of net
book value of property, plant, and equipment
to total assets for firm j in year t

Leveragej,t

SalesGj,t
MtoBj,t
Mktcapj,t

NOAj,t

ROEj,t

Capitalj,t
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Appendix two
Examples of firms that conform to/ do not conform to the underlying earnings
disclosure guidelines12
Firms that conform to guidelines

Firms that do not conform to guidelines

Rio Tinto Limited

Fortescue Metals Group Ltd

Brambles Limited

Sydney Airport

Boral Limited

Fletcher Building Limited

AWE Limited

Mineral Resources Limited

Beach Energy Limited

Sigma Healthcare Limited

BlueScope Steel Limited

Resolute Mining Limited

12

The annual reports were collected from DatAnalysis Premium database.
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